JAPAN'S PEACE OFFER TO CHINA

tion, but that he did not know that he (Mr. Matsuoka) had dis-
closed his interpretation to representatives of foreign governments.
Apropos, he said that Mr. Matsuoka had told the Prime Minister
that Mr. Grew had reported to Washington that the last cabinet
change was due to American pressure on Japan. I told Mr. Ushiba
that we had reported nothing of the sort. I said that I could tell
him in confidence that we had reported that the cabinet change
was due chiefly to two causes : first, the German attack on Soviet
Russia, which upset Japanese expectation, when signing the Alliance,
that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia ;
and, second, the conflict of interpretations by the Prime Minister
and Mr. Matsuoka with regard to the scope and significance of
the Triple Alliance. Mr. Ushiba said that we had been entirely
correct.

The concluding portions of the conversation were devoted
largely to Mr. Ushiba's stressing the importance of the American
Government's returning a favourable reply to the Japanese proposal
as soon as possible. Mr. Ushiba reverted again and again to the
approach of the 27th of September, the first anniversary of the signing
of the Alliance.

JAPAN'S PEACE OFFER TO CHINA

September 22, 1941

I called on Foreign Minister Toyoda this afternoon at his request.
After reading from a document in Japanese which was then
translated into English, he made substantially the following oral
statement:

1. The suggestion that the President meet with Prince Konoye
was contained by implication in the message received by the President
from the Prime Minister.

2. The Japanese Government had intended that the proposed
meeting should discuss the questions at issue between the two countries
requiring agreement, and that subsequently through normal diplo-
matic channels the details for executing the understanding reached
at the meeting should be worked out. The Government of the United
States, however, had adopted the view that the problems which had
emerged from the preliminary and informal conversations should
be agreed on in advance of the meeting.

3. The Foreign Minister had explained that in his statement
made to me on September 4 he had replied to all of the questions
raised by the Government of the United States, and that his
statement of September 4 had widened rather than reduced the field
of the negotiations which the Japanese Government is willing to
cover,

4. The Foreign Minister then gave me the basic terms of peace
which Japan is prepared to offer China, to be communicated to the